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Has the Fourth Amendment Gone Adrift in
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez?
- U.S. -, 77 L. Ed. 2d 22, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983)
At midday on March 6, 1980, two customs officers sighted a
forty-foot sailboat anchored in the Calcasieu River Ship Channel.1
The officers noticed the words "Henry Morgan II" and a home
port designated as "Basilea." They suspected that the sailboat was
foreign because they did not recognize "Basilea" as a United States
port. As they approached the vessel, the officers sighted a man.
When the officers twice asked if he was all right, he merely
shrugged his shoulders, appearing not to understand English.
Shortly thereafter, both officers boarded the boat and asked to see
the vessel's documentation. The defendant, Hamparian, handed
them a document which appeared to be a request to change the
registration of the boat from Swiss registry to French registry. It
was written in French and dated February 6, 1980. While talking
with Hamparian, the officers smelled the burning odor of
marijuana. One of the officers opened the hatch and found 5,800
pounds of marijuana. The other defendant, Villamonte-Marquez,
was asleep on top of the bales. The officers arrested both men and
charged them with importation and possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute the drug.
Prior to their conviction in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana," the defendants filed a
pretrial suppression motion challenging the search of their vessel
on constitutional grounds.3 The district court denied the motion.
The defendants appealed, alleging that the customs officers' search
and seizure of their sailboat and its cargo violated their fourth
amendment rights.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
1. The channel connects the Gulf of Mexico with Lake Charles, Louisiana.
2. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 482 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
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Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction, finding an
invalid search.' The court found that there were no articulable
facts giving rise to any reasonable suspicion as required by the
fourth amendment.' The boarding of the vessel was held to be
unreasonable.
7
On December 21, 1981, the government's motion for a
voluntary dismissal in the district court under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 48(a) was granted.8 On January 18, 1982,
almost one month after the case was dismissed, the government
filed its petition for certiorari. Notwithstanding this apparent
jurisdictional defect, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and held, reversed: Under 19 U.S.C. 1581(a),'
customs officers were authorized to board any vessel at any place
in the United States to examine documents even without
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. The Court held that the
strong governmental interest in assuring compliance with
documentation requirements, particularly in waters where there
was a need to deter and to apprehend smugglers, far outweighed
the limited intrusion of the defendants' fourth amendment rights.
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, U.S. , 77 L. Ed.
2d 22, 103 S. Ct. - (1983).
Villamonte was a case of first impression in which the
Supreme Court of the United States decided the reasonableness of
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
5. 652 F.2d at 488.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, - U.S. - 77 L. ED. 2d 22, 35, 103 S. CT.
2573, 2583 (1983). Subsequent to the Court of Appeals reversal on August 3, 1981:
Rehearing was denied on October 19, and the mandate issued on October 29. On
November 20, the Court of Appeals granted the Government's motion to recall
the mandate and stay its reissuance until December 7, pending a petition for a
writ of certiorari in this court. The Government, however, permitted the stay to
expire without filing the petition, and the mandate issued on December 8.
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976) provides that:
(a) Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or
vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he
may be authorized, within a customs-enforcement area established under the
Anti-Smuggling Act, or at any other authorized place, without as well as within
his district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and
examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any
person, trunk, package, of cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop
such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
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a customs search of a boat under the fourth amendment. The
majority held that "police on a roving random patrol may stop and
board any vessel at any time, on any navigable waters accessible to
the open sea, with no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
believe that there has been a crime or a border crossing.""0
The Court began its examination of the challenged intrusion
by analogizing the fourth amendment issues applicable to searches
of vehicular traffic on land." Generally, automobile searches fall
into two categories of fourth amendment exceptions: border
searches and checkpoint stops. Border searches normally occur at
fixed points along the United States borders with Canada and
Mexico. The objective of these searches is to control the flow of
goods and illegal aliens across the border. On the other hand,
permanent checkpoints are usually located at intersections of
important roads leading away from the border. An officer is
permitted to stop a car at these checkpoints for brief questioning
even in the absence of reasonable suspicion.'"
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, the Border Patrol's
warrantless search of an automobile twenty-five miles north of the
Mexican-United States border was held invalid absent a search
warrant, probable cause or consent.'3 The Court held that the
search for illegal aliens could not be classified as a border search
because it was conducted at a point too far removed from the
border.14 The Court recognized the validity of true border searches
conducted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion but only
if they occurred at the border or its functional equivalent.'5
The Villamonte Court went on to analyze its prior decisions in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,'6 United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte,17 and Delaware v. Prouse.18 In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court
held that a vehicle stop near the Mexican border, where the only
10. Villamonte, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. The majority included Justices Rehnquist, Burger,
White, Blackmun, Powell and O'Connor. The dissent included Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens.
11. Id. at 2579.
12. Id., (relying on United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976)).
13. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
14. Id. at 275-276.
15. Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51, 88
(1977).
16. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
17. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
18. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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ground for suspicion was that the occupants appeared to be of
Mexican ancestry, was not reasonable under the fourth
amendment." Except at the border and its functional equivalent,
these roving patrols were prohibited from stopping vehicles unless
they were aware of "specific articulable facts together with rational
inferences from those facts."120 The Court balanced the individual's
fourth amendment rights against the government's interests in
preventing the illegal entry of aliens. The public's interest in the
free flow of legitimate traffic was considered far more important
than the government's interests.21
In Martinez-Fuerte, the scales tipped in favor of the
government. The Supreme Court held that the Border Patrol could
randomly stop vehicles for questioning, at designated checkpoints
away from the Mexican border, even in the absence of any
individualized suspicion that the vehicle contained illegal aliens.2 2
The decision rested on the important public interest in controlling
the influx of illegal aliens.28 This constituted a "far less intrusive"
stop than the Almeida roving-patrol stop.2 4 The Court considered
the roving patrol stops to be more intrusive because they could
occur at any time of the day or night and within 100 air miles of
the border.25 Routine checkpoint stops were considered less
intrusive because they would not take the public by surprise and
they involved "less discretionary enforcement activity. '' 26 Finally,
the Court specifically stated that the holding was limited "to the
type of stops described in this opinion. 2 7 The Court held that any
other detentions had to be based on probable cause or consent.2
The limited holding in Martinez-Fuerte was not extended
three years later in Prouse. In the absence of any traffic or
equipment violations, a police cruiser stopped an automobile in
Delaware to check the driver's license and car registration.29 The
Court held that the state's interest in discretionary spot checks as
a means of ensuring safety on the roadways did not outweigh an
19. 422 U.S. at 876.
20. Id. at 884.
21. Id. at 883.
22. 428 U.S. at 545.
23. Id. at 556.
24. Id. at 558.
25. Id. at 559.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 567.
28. Id.
29. 440 U.S. at 650.
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individual's right to privacy. The stop was plainly unreasonable
where there was no articulable and reasonable suspicion to believe
the motorist was unlicensed or the car was not registered.8
In each of the vehicle-stop precedents, from Almeida to
Prouse, the Court required "that the stop or search be supported
by either probable cause, reasonable suspicion or another
discretion-limiting feature such as the use of fixed checkpoints."'I
Yet, the majority in Viliamonte fashioned a rule that police could
board a boat at any time "with nothing more to guide them than
their unsupported hunch, whim, or even their desire to harass or to
flaunt their authority.
8 2
The Villamonte Court tried to justify its departure from
precedent by distinguishing "between vessels located in waters
offering ready access to the open sea and automobiles on principal
thoroughfares in the border area."38 The Court reasoned that it
was impracticable to have permanent checkpoints on waters where
there were no established "avenues" as on land.84 The Court
observed that "customs officials do not have the practical
alternative of spotting all vessels which might have come from the
open sea and herding them into one or more canals or straits in
order to make fixed checkpoint stops. 0
The majority in Villamonte seemingly ignored the facts of the
case. The boarding took place in the Calcasieu River Ship
Channel-a limited access waterway. Under these circumstances it
would have been easy to establish a designated checkpoint for
vessels at the entrance to the channel. In Prouse, the Court held
that random, roving patrol traffic stops were unconstitutional in
any setting. The dissent in Villamonte recognized this and argued
that the rule should apply to searches in inland navigable
waterways. s6
The Villamonte Court granted certiorari because of the
conflict in the circuit courts on the constitutional requirements for
maritime searches. The Court, however, ignored the reasoning in
the circuit court cases without explanation. The Fifth Circuit
30. Id. at 663.
31. Villamonte, 103 S. Ct. at 2588.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2580.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2589.
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Court of Appeals began to confront the issue of maritime searches
when drug smuggling in the 1970's sharply increased. The
decisions varied in their interpretation of the statutory authority
to search boats within fourth amendment constraints.
In United States v. Warren37 and United States v. Freeman,a"
maritime searches were held valid in spite of the fact that the
Coast Guard conducted documentation and safety inspections of
vessels located outside the 12-mile border limit without reasonable
suspicion. Statutory authority provided the basis for the searches
under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).3 1 Broadly stated, the courts upheld
maritime searches, although conducted without probable cause,
but failed to explain why it was not required. The assumption was
that safety inspections did not require probable cause.
In United States v. Whitaker,"0 the Fifth Circuit extended the
Freeman and Warren decisions to vessels within the three mile
border. In Whitaker, the court relied upon a broad interpretation
of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). It recognized the "difficulty of policing the
ocean frontiers, the impracticability of stopping vessels at a
designated point in the water, the brief and routine nature of the
detention and the broad powers historically granted to customs
officials. ' 41 The court did not determine to what extent the fourth
amendment would place geographical limitations on stops
pursuant to section 1581(a), since the stop was within customs
waters.
The Fifth Circuit has also given section 1581 a narrow
constitutional interpretation. In United States v. Guillen-
Linares42 and United States v. Serrano,"3 it held that the boarding
37. 578 F. 2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978). The Coast Guard boarded a U.S. shrimping vessel on
the high seas with cause, pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).
3A 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978).
39. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976) provides:
The Coast Guard may make inquires, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States
has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of
laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty
officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or
to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquires to those on
board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and
search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
40. 592 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1979). Since the vessel was sighted within the three-mile
border, the border search doctrine was considered irrelevant.
41. Id. at 829.
42. 643 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1981). The search was held to be invalid where customs
officers' only suspicion was that the shrimping vessel was travelling in Tampa Bay at night
[Vol. 16:1
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of a vessel while in inland waters did not constitute a border
search and, in the absence of any articulated facts or circumstances
which might have aroused customs officers, the search was
unreasonable. Both cases construe section 1581(a) narrowly within
the fourth amendment constraints of reasonable suspicion.
The court of appeals decision in Villamonte relied on United
States v. D'Antignac" where the Serrano rule was developed into
the test that "the constitutionality of the boarding [of a vessel in
inland waters under section 1581(a)] turns ...on one of the
following two principles: (1) a border search; or (2) a limited
investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion of law
violation.""' The latter principle was applied in D'Antignac. The
court held that the search of the boat was valid since there was
reasonable suspicion to believe that the boat operators were
involved in drug smuggling." More importantly, the court noted
that section 1581(a) is couched in very broad language but it was
circumscribed by the reasonableness requirement of the fourth
amendment.
47
The majority in Villamonte ignored the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning concerning maritime searches. Instead, it relied on a
comparison of boats and cars in order to justify its conclusions.
The Court emphasized that vessels had a lesser expectation of
privacy. Therefore, vessels were substantially different from
vehicles. The Court concluded that the need to make document
without the required navigation lights.
43. 607 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1979). This case involved the boarding of a vessel by officers
while it was anchored in waters adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico.
44. 628 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1980). The search was held to be valid where the officers had
prior information indicating that the vessel was involved in smuggling contraband.
45. 652 F.2d at 485 (citing D'Antignac, 628 F.2d at 433).
46. Id. at 434. The court considered that the following factors created a reasonable
suspicion:
The facts known to Officer Swigart included the following: "He observed the
erratic movements of the vessel in the Intercoastal Waterway late at night for
approximately one hour; there were no other vessels in the vicinity either before,
during or after the sighting and subsequent boarding; he went to investigate and
found a shrimp boat bearing the name 'Little Hornet' pulling into the dock; to
his knowledge coastal shrimping was out of season; he had received prior
information that the 'Little Hornet' was suspected by the United States Custom
Service of being involved in smuggling contraband; he had not seen her in the
Valona dock ares at all during the spring of 1978. Based on the above facts, the
district court found that a reasonable suspicion of law violation existed such that
Officer Swigert could make an investigatory boarding to ascertain the identity of
those aboard."
47. Id. at 432.
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checks was great and the resultant intrusion on fourth amendment
rights was modest."8
The dissent in Villamonte argued that the intrusion was
modest when compared to a full detailed search of a vessel. The
comparison was closer to the entry of a private house than to the
stops in Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse.49 The dissent also criticized
the Court's comparison of cars and boats. It noted that one's
expectation of privacy is greater on a boat, since a boat, unlike a
car, can serve as one's actual dwelling place.50
The dissent, unlike the majority, apparently relied upon the
reasoning in the circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Piner,5' held that a search was invalid, where the Coast Guard
had randomly stopped a 43-foot sailboat in San Francisco Bay in
order to conduct a routine document and safety inspection. Since
the Coast Guard did not have cause to suspect noncompliance with
rules or regulations, the search was considered unreasonable." The
court also held that the subjective intrusion on an individual's
privacy outweighed the governmental need to conduct safety and
registration inspections.5
In contrast, the Villamonte Court emphasized the
government's interests in conducting documentation checks and
the difficulty of these inspections at sea. It reasoned that at sea
there were no license plates, so it was difficult to determine if a
boat was in compliance with the requirements.5' Additionally,
domestic and foreign boats must follow certain documentation
procedures, which provide a means of controlling legitimate trade
and the safety on American waterways.55
The Court emphasized the difficulty in documentation checks
because boats do not carry uniform license plates like cars. As the
dissent appropriately noted, it is "easy and comparatively
inexpensive to provide boats with such means of identification."'"
Even assuming that the need to check documents is great, the
48. Villamonte, 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
49. Id. at 2588.
50. Id.
51. 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 359.
53. Id. at 361.
54. Villamonte, 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
55. Id. at 2581.
56. Id. at 2590.
[Vol. 16:1
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Court did "not explain why that need invariably requires the
police to board a vessel, rather than to come alongside or to
request that someone from the vessel come on board the police
vessel.
117
The dissent in Villamonte also placed more importance on an
individual's fourth amendment rights rather than on the public
policy of controlling drug smuggling. Although the majority did not
discuss the national problem of drug smuggling, this issue looms
over the decision. Instead, the majority concealed this issue by
discussing the important public policy of documentation checks. In
reality, it may not have been documents that the Court was
worried about, but drug smuggling. Since the facts leading up to
the search did not show any evidence of drug smuggling, the Court
was constrained to legitimize this unwarranted search.
Not only did the Court take this opportunity to demonstrate
its attitude toward illegal drug activity but it also used it to chip
away at the fourth amendment. The government voluntarily
dismissed the indictment against the defendants in December
1981. Then, in January 1982, the government filed its petition for
certiorari. Normally, dismissal by the court of appeals moots a
case. At that point, the Supreme Court should not have considered
the case for certiorari because the prosecution of the case had
terminated. However, with no explanation of why it overlooked
this well-settled principle of appellate review, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Thus, it took the opportunity to erode the
fourth amendment.
The Villamonte majority also failed to address the
international ramifications of its decision. The "Henry Morgan I"
was foreign and carried French documentation papers.58 Section
1581(a) authorizes searches of any vessel or vehicle "at any place
in the United States or within the customs waters or . . .within a
customs-enforcement area . . . or at any authorized place." 59 The
customs agent's power extends to foreign vessels. All transient
vessels must obey the rules and regulations of the particular
territorial sea. 0 In general, all ships have the right to enjoy a
foreign country's waters while conforming to its laws. Any coastal
state can take the necessary precautions to protect itself from acts
57. Id.
58. Villamonte, 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976). See, full text of the statue, supra note 9.
60. Carmichael, supra note 15, at 57.
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prejudicial to its security.61 Any boarding and searching of a
foreign vessel should be based on balancing the state's interest in
controlling its navigable waterways against the foreign vessel's
right to freedom of navigation. Factors weighed in this analysis
include: "consequentiality and range of interest sought to be
protected by the coastal state, the scope of authority claimed, the
importance of the area for navigation, the impact of non-
interference on the coastal state, and alternative sanctions
available for coastal protection." 62
A recognized authority, James S. Carmichael, suggests that
there should be some standard, such as 'reasonable suspicion,'
before searching a foreign vessel, in order to maintain international
law's concept of freedom of the seas as proposed in the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone." In general, all ships
are entitled to a right of innocent passage through territorial
waters.64 However, transient vessels must obey reasonable rules
and regulations set forth by the sovereign state.65 If there is
reasonable suspicion to believe a crime or a breach of the peace is
taking place, then a boarding of a foreign ship may be necessary.6
Not only should reasonable suspicion serve as a threshold
requirement for searches of foreign vessels but also searches not
satisfying this requirement should be conducted at the border or
its functional equivalent or a permanent checkpoint area. In a
maritime context, this border or checkpoint area could be the
entrance to a river, strait or channel. This would serve the
administrative need for document checks without infringing on the
vessel's right to free passage. This alternative would reduce the
problems of policing the maritime boundary. The Supreme Court
has justified these checkpoint searches on the basis of a broad
national interest ensuring safety on American waterways.6
These suggested standards would conform to the present
requirements set forth in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone.68 By maintaining consistent rules both
61. B. BRITTON & L. WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS, 78 (3d ed.
1972).
62. Carmichael, supra note 15, at 58.




67. Villamonte, 103 S. Ct. at 2581.
68. See Articles 14, 16, 17, Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
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inside and outside territorial waters, foreign vessels could enjoy the
essence of freedom of the seas. In Villamonte, the United States
has set a precedent in treating a foreign vessel with a lesser
standard than the international convention requires for maritime
searches. 69 Thus, the possible ramifications of this decision may
resound internationally.
The Supreme Court has also abandoned fourth amendment
protections, apparently in order to promote a public policy against
illegal drug smuggling. The application of the balancing test shows
that the government's interest in controlling drug smuggling far
exceeds the individual's fourth amendment rights. It was precisely
this freedom from arbitrary intrusions which the fourth
amendment was designed to protect. The majority has minimized
the individual's interests at sea by placing the highest premium on
law enforcement. Its expansive interpretation of section 1581(a)
provides a decision based solely on statutory grounds while
abandoning constitutional grounds.
Furthermore, the Court's comparison between cars and boats
does not hold water. One's expectation of privacy in a boat may be
even higher than in a car since boats can serve as dwelling places.
The comparison between cars and boats is simply an excuse to
support the nonapplicability of the fourth amendment in an area
of the law where it had traditionally been applied by the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits. These circuits have consistently interpreted section
1581(a) within the confines of the Bill of Rights.
The Court's argument on documentation checks also proves to
be insufficient given the facts of this case. Since the Calcasieu
River Ship Channel has a distinct entrance, it would have been
possible to stop the "Henry Morgan II" at a fixed checkpoint prior
to entering the channel to verify proper documentation. Based on
precedent, the search and seizure should have fallen within one of
the following categories: (1) a border search; (2) a fixed checkpoint
search; or (3) a limited investigatory stop based upon reasonable
suspicion.
The Supreme Court's upholding of a search on less than
reasonable suspicion, in the absence of any other exception, can
only serve to weaken the protection of the individual's rights
provided by the fourth amendment. This decision may affect all
[1964], 15 U.S.T. 1606.
69. Id.
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pleasure boaters. By granting the state this power at sea, there is
no limit to the intrusion upon an individual's privacy. The
balancing test has tipped too far in the state's direction. Careful
application of the balancing test would protect the government's
interest in controlling drug traffic by only allowing searches of
vessels reasonably believed to be smuggling.
The international consequences of this decision are still
unknown. It may, however, have provided foreign governments
with a license to create new standards for American vessels passing
through their territorial waters. Thus, the time-honored respect for
foreign vessels may have been cast adrift in order to foster a strong
public policy against drug smuggling.
CYNTHIA BIANCHI
